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“The SAFE Act and Beyond: What Role, If Any, for State and Local Government in the Regulation of Firearms”

April 5, 2016

ALBANY LAW SCHOOL
The SAFE Act and Beyond: What Role, If Any, for State and Local Government in the Regulation of Firearms?”

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SPEAKER BIOGRAPHIES

Leah Gunn Barrett is Executive Director of New Yorkers Against Gun Violence. Prior to joining NYAGV, she was a dean and adjunct lecturer at Columbia University’s School of International & Public Affairs (SIPA). She has held senior management positions with The Economist Group, Data Resources (DRI) Europe and Tetra Pak UK in London. She was the Executive Director of CeaseFire Maryland from 2003-2006 and in 2005 received the Mayor’s Citation from Baltimore Mayor Martin O’Malley for her work. She holds a B.A. from Carleton College, a Master’s in International Affairs from Columbia University, and a Master’s in Teaching from Johns Hopkins University. Ms. Barrett lost her older brother, Greg, to gun violence in 1997. He was shot and killed during a robbery at his business. He was 40 years old and left a wife and two teen-aged children. Ms. Barrett has two children, a son who is 25 and a daughter who is 19. She lives in Brooklyn.

Prof. Gary E. Kalbaugh is a Special Professor of Law at Hofstra Law School and a Lecturer-in-Law at Columbia Law School. He is the founder of Conserving Tradition Inc., a not-for-profit with the mission of preserving traditional and sustainable agricultural practices for posterity. In additional, his practice areas include derivatives and banking law. He has served on the New York City Bar Association’s Committee on the Regulation of Futures and chaired the Over-the-Counter Derivatives and CLE Sub-Committees. He is currently a member of the New York City Bar Association’s Banking Law Committee and is also a member of the New York State Bar Association’s Derivatives and Structured Products Law Committee. Professor Kalbaugh is a founding board member of the Forum for Global Financial Regulation and board member and treasurer of the national animal welfare charity, HeARTs Speak. He is a frequent speaker and commentator on derivatives and environmental conservation law topics, chairing, among others, the New York City Bar Association’s 2012, 2015, and 2016 Futures and Derivatives conferences. A graduate of the National University of Ireland, University College Cork (Bachelor of Civil Laws, cum laude, 1998), he received a Master of Laws at the University of Pennsylvania in 1999.
Samuel S. Yasgur, Esq., served from 1966 to 1974 as Assistant District Attorney and Deputy Chief in the Rackets Bureau, and as Chief in the Indictments Bureau, of the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office. From 1974 to 1984, he was Deputy County Attorney in Charge of Litigation, First Deputy County Attorney, and County Attorney for the Westchester County Attorney’s Office. Mr. Yasgur was a Litigation Partner at Hall Dickler et al. from 1984 to 2003. From 2004 until his retirement in February 2016, he served as County Attorney for Sullivan County. As the chief civil legal officer for Sullivan County, a municipal corporation with an annual operating budget of approximately $200 million, he personally handled substantially all of the County’s federal litigation matters, including, without limitation: civil rights lawsuits, prisoner lawsuits and personnel lawsuits. Since then, Mr. Yasgur has represented Sullivan County in a number of federal matters, in an “of counsel” capacity. He is past president of the Sullivan County Bar Association and former president of the County Attorney’s Association of the State of New York. Mr. Yasgur taught criminal law/procedure at Mercy College and has lectured extensively on trial practice, including a guest lecture before the New York State Court of Appeals. Mr. Yasgur graduated from Cornell University in 1963 and the University of Chicago Law School in 1966.
The SAFE Act and Beyond: What Role, If Any, For State and Local Government in the Regulation of Firearms?

**Gun Control: The Current State of Play**

In January 2013, a month after the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting, New York passed new legislation, the SAFE Act, that Gov. Andrew Cuomo has called the “toughest” gun law in the country. Three months later governors in Connecticut and Maryland signed into law similarly restrictive gun measures. In the aftermath of a number of mass shootings across the nation, state and local municipal governments continue to re-visit the balance between public safety concerns and the Second Amendment’s constitutional guarantee of an American citizen’s right to “keep and bear arms.”

**Heller I and II: SCOTUS Outlines Framework of 2nd Amendment Protections**

The U.S. Supreme Court in *District of Columbia v. Heller (Heller I)* held that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual’s right to keep and bear arms in common use for lawful purposes, without reference to membership in a “militia.” The Court struck down a D.C. statute that, in effect, banned handgun possession by prohibiting carry of an unregistered firearm and prohibiting handgun registration. The Court’s opinion concluded that the Second Amendment codifies law-abiding citizens’ pre-existing right to possess and carry weapons for lawful purposes such as the defense of one’s self, family, and property. The Court also ruled against provisions of the statute that required residents to keep firearms either unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock in the home, stating that this functionally removed an individual’s right to “keep and bear arms” for the purpose of self-protection.

The Court acknowledged that the right to keep and bear arms in common use for lawful purposes is not “a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” The Court declined to establish the specific parameters of Second Amendment protections but did say “it does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.” The Court noted that the decision did not reverse “longstanding prohibitions” on gun possession by felons or the mentally ill, nor prohibitions on weapons not “in common use” for lawful purposes such as machine guns.

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2 *Id.* at 574–75, 628–29.
3 *Id.* at 592, 628.
4 *Id.* at 628–29
5 *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 626.
6 *Id.* at 625.
7 *Id.* at 624-26
The Supreme Court in *Heller I* refrained from establishing the level of scrutiny for evaluating Second Amendment restrictions but refuted Justice Breyer’s suggestion that cases should be decided using an “interest-balancing inquiry.” On remand, the Circuit Court for the D.C. Circuit, in *Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II)*, endorsed a two-step test for analyzing the constitutionality of gun laws that is now commonly being used by other courts. It asks: (1) whether a statutory provision infringes on the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms in common use for lawful purposes; and (2) if yes, whether the provision survives the “appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny.” In the absence of a uniform standard, courts are to apply intermediate or strict scrutiny depending on the extent to which a challenged law burdens one’s Second Amendment rights. In *Heller II*, the appellate court held that the amended D.C. statute, which required gun registration and banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines, survived intermediate scrutiny because the law was substantially related to the government’s interests in controlling crime and protecting law enforcement officers.

**McDonald: Second Amendment Applies to State and Municipal Governments**

Following *Heller I*, citizens brought an action against the City of Chicago arguing that the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms is also protected against state and local government intrusion. Analyzing the issue under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court held that “a provision of the Bill of Rights that protects a right that is fundamental from an American perspective applies equally to the Federal Government and the States.” The Court concluded that self-defense is a fundamental right and that hand guns are “the most preferred firearm in the nation . . . for protection of one’s home and family.” As a result, The Court held that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is also protected from intrusion by state and municipal governments.

**The Second Circuit: New York and the SAFE Act**

In the wake of these Supreme Court and lower court decisions, the Second Circuit has held that “heightened scrutiny is triggered only by those restrictions that operate as a substantial burden on the

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8 554 U.S. at 634–35.
9 670 F.3d 1244, 1252. (D.C. Cir. 2011).
10 Id.
11 *Heller*, 670 F.3d at 1257.
12 Id. at 1258, 1264.
14 *McDonald*, at 791, 130 S. Ct. at 3050, 177 L. Ed. 2d at 929
15 Id. at 767, 130 S. Ct. at 3036, 177 L. Ed. 2d at 914.
16 *McDonald*, at 791, 130 S. Ct. at 3050, 177 L. Ed. 2d at 929.
ability of law-abiding citizens to possess and use a firearm for self-defense (or other lawful purposes).”

In *New York Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo*, the court upheld the New York State SAFE Act and applied intermediate scrutiny and “inquired only whether the challenged laws are ‘substantially related’ to the achievement of a governmental interest.” The court made it clear that while Second Amendment rights stand at their zenith in the home, firearm legislation that regulates gun possession outside of the home is evaluated using an intermediate level of scrutiny. As an example, in a previous case, *Kachalsky v. County of Westchester*, the 2nd Circuit found that states have the ability to determine the criteria for granting concealed-carry licenses and may require “proper cause” for the license request, and need not accept any and all general requests.

Recently, the 4th Circuit has ruled that strict scrutiny is the correct level of scrutiny for any gun control legislation and remanded the *Kolbe v. Hogan* case back to the District Court. Following appeal from the Maryland Attorney General the 4th Circuit has granted an “en banc review to be conducted May 11, 2016. If the Circuit upholds the original ruling, the stage is set for a future return of the Second Amendment in front of the Supreme Court.

**Federal and New York State Preemption: What Remains In Play for Local Governments?**

The question of the propriety of local regulation of firearms does not start and stop with the 2nd Amendment however. Federal law can preempt state or local law in three ways: the federal statute can contain express preemption language; the federal legislation can be so pervasive as to “completely occupy the field”, or irreconcilable conflict with the federal statutory scheme. The Supreme Court in *Heller I*, clearly indicated that the right to keep and bear arms codified in the Second Amendment did not “completely occupy the field” to the extent that it purveys “a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”

In New York, local municipal governments enjoy a high degree of home rule powers under the State Constitution to adopt and amend local laws to protect the public interest. The New York Court
of Appeals has held that although the home rule provision grants broad police powers to local
governments to guard the welfare of citizens, municipalities may not adopt laws that are inconsistent
with either the constitution or any general law of the State. A local government may not exercise its
Home Rule powers by adopting local law that is inconsistent with constitutional or general law and may
not exercise its police power when the Legislature has preempted an area of regulation. New York’s
grounds for preemption roughly parallel the three categories set out by federal law: express presumption;
field preemption; and conflict preemption. A local law will be ruled invalid not only where it expressly
contradicts an existing state law but also were state regulation has clearly expressed the state’s intention
to completely preempt a field. A local law regulating a field preempted by the State goes against State
interest by either prohibiting conduct which the State law allows or by imposing additional restrictions
on rights granted by the State.

It appears the Legislature intended for the SAFE ACT of 2013 to preempt local government
action. The sponsors of the enacting legislation described the Safe Act as “a thoughtful network of laws
providing the toughest, most comprehensive…answer to gun violence in the nation.”

The question for local governments in New York State, which has not been answered yet in the
courts, is whether the SAFE Act preempts local governments from taking legislative action to regulate
firearms that exceeds the state law, but does not violate the limits set by the 2nd Amendment in *Heller I*
and its progeny.

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26 *New York State Club Assn v. City of New York*, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 217 (Court of Appeals, 1987)
27 *Id.* at 273
28 *Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Suffolk County*, 71 N.Y.2d at 97
29 *Id.*
30 Sponsor’s Memo: New York State Senate Introducer’s Memorandum in Support. S2230 Klein last accessed 3/31/2016 at
http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/navigate.cgi?NVDTO:
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A Sitting Duck: Local Government Regulation of Hunting and Weapons Discharge in the State of New York

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ARTICLE

A Sitting Duck: Local Government Regulation of Hunting and Weapons Discharge in the State of New York

GARY E. KALBAUGH*

I. INTRODUCTION


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1. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 11-0931(2), (4) (McKinney 2014). The changes became effective on April 1, 2014. Id. at 105.

2. It also imposes limitations on the discharge of a firearm and crossbow. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 11-0931(4)(a)(1)-(2). Firearm is defined by Department of Environmental Conservation regulations as any rifle, pistol, shotgun or muzzleloading firearm which by force of gunpowder, or an airgun [using ammunition no smaller than .17 caliber and producing projectile velocities of 600 feet per second or more]... that expels a missile or projectile capable of killing, wounding or otherwise inflicting physical damage upon fish, wildlife or other animals.

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 180.3(a) (2014). A crossbow is defined by Department of Environmental Conservation regulations as “a bow and string, either compound or recurve, that launches a bolt or arrow, mounted upon a stock with a trigger that holds the string and limbs under tension until released.” Id. § 2.3(a)(1).
recurve bow or compound bow which is designed to be used by holding the bow at arm’s length, with arrow on the string, and which is drawn, pulled and released by hand or with the aid of a hand-held trigger device attached to the bowstring.”³

Before the 2014 amendment, longbows could not be discharged in such a way that an arrow passes over a road or within 500 feet of a dwelling, except with the consent of the owner of such dwelling.⁴ The 2014 amendment reduced this 500-foot setback to 150 feet, making New York’s rule generally consistent with that of neighboring states.⁵ This is a radical difference: a circle with a 500 foot radius has an area of slightly over 18 acres while a circle with a 150 foot radius has an area of slightly over 1.6 acres.⁶

³. Id. § 2.4(a)(3).
⁴. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 11-0931(4)(a)(1)-(2), (4)(b)(1) (McKinney 2014). There are a variety of exceptions, such as programs sponsored by public schools, target ranges, and over water while hunting migratory birds. Id. § 11-0931(4)(b)(2)-(4). Since these are outside of the scope hereof, they are not further discussed.
⁵. See Environmental Conservation Law, § 8, 2014 N.Y. LAWS 95. See also N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 11-0931(4)(a)(2). New Jersey and Pennsylvania have state laws imposing 150-foot rules. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 23:4-16(d)(2) (West 2014); 34 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2505(c)(2) (2008). Connecticut has no state law distance specified. In the case of Connecticut, though the Commissioner of the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection has the statutory authority to impose a specified setback requirement by rule, the Commissioner has only done so with respect to firearms, and there is no state-level discharge distance requirement with respect to longbows. See CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 26-66-1(d) (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 26-66(13) (1988).

It is prohibited to hunt with, shoot, or carry a loaded firearm within 500 feet of any building occupied by people or domestic animals, or used for storage of flammable material . . . unless written permission for lesser distances is obtained from the owner and carried. Landowners, their spouse, and lineal descendants are exempt from this restriction, providing any building involved is their own. The 500 foot zone does not apply to bowhunting.


⁶. The area of a circle is equal to pi multiplied by the square of the radius or πr². This equation is derived from the proof of Archimedes. See ARCHIMEDES, THE WORKS OF ARCHIMEDES 91-98 (T.L. Heath trans., Cambridge University Press 1897).
II. NEW YORK’S GENERAL LAW PROVISIONS REGULATING DISCHARGE OF A LONG BOW

A. New York’s Regulation of Wildlife

New York’s Environmental Conservation Law proclaims the State’s title to wildlife:

The State of New York owns all fish, game, wildlife, shellfish, crustacea and protected insects in the state, except those legally acquired and held in private ownership. Any person who kills, takes or possesses such fish, game, wildlife, shellfish, crustacea or protected insects thereby consents that title thereto shall remain in the state for the purpose of regulating and controlling their use and disposition.

The Environmental Conservation Law vests a state agency, the Department of Environmental Conservation, with the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the purposes of the Environmental Conservation Law. This mandate includes the regulation of hunting and discharge of firearms, longbows, and crossbows.

B. New York’s Historical Regulation of Discharge of a Long Bow

Historically, New York State did not have a specified distance requirement with respect to the discharge of a firearm, let alone a longbow. In 1949, the Legislature amended the Environmental Conservation Law to impose the 500-foot setback requirement with respect to firearms discharged within Rockland County. In the following years the counties to which the requirement applied were gradually expanded so that, by 1957, when the requirements were made equally applicable to a

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7. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 3-0101.
8. See id. § 11-0701.
discharge of a longbow, the 500-foot setback requirement applied generally throughout the State.\footnote{11} The addition of longbows to the 500-foot setback rule was upon a recommendation by the Joint Legislative Committee on Revision of the Conservation Law. In proposing a bill to add longbows to the 500-foot setback rule, the Joint Legislative Committee explained:

This bill is intended not only as a safety measure but also in consideration of the objections of resident landowners to having wild game, particularly deer, shot in close proximity to dwellings. Some hunters offend resident landowners and abuse their hunting privileges by taking advantage of the easy targets offered by semi-tame deer and small game pets in hunting season. The bill, while not seriously curtailing the opportunities for hunting by bow, should create a better feeling between archers and landowners.\footnote{12}

For over fifty years, the 500-foot setback for discharge of a firearm applied equally to the discharge of a longbow until, as noted above, in 2014 the setback for discharge of a longbow was reduced to 150 feet from a dwelling.

This change, recommended by New York State’s Department of Environmental Conservation, was motivated by, among others, the occurrence of only two reported bow hunting injuries in the State of New York, both due to self-inflicted accidental cuts while handling arrowheads,\footnote{13} the experience of neighboring states with


http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/6
lower setbacks, and the perceived safety of a longbow when compared with a firearm:

Arrows have a much shorter range than projectiles shot from a firearm. The maximum range of an arrow occurs when it is released at a 45 degree angle of elevation, from which it could theoretically travel a couple hundred yards. However, this trajectory is extremely unlikely in any bowhunting situation. Archery shots taken at deer are typically discharged either on a horizontal plane or on a downward trajectory. In these situations, an arrow travels only a short distance before either hitting the target or dropping to the ground. Moreover, most bowhunters prefer to shoot from an elevated position (e.g., tree stands or tree blinds), and arrows are discharged directly towards the ground. Bowhunting also typically occurs at much shorter ranges than firearms hunting (25 yards or less), meaning that the existence of unwanted objects in the field of fire is extremely rare.14

Perceived benefits of controlling deer populations include reduction of human injuries due to deer-vehicle collisions,15 reduction of Lyme Disease, Babesiosis, Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, and other diseases for which ticks resident on deer are a direct or indirect vector,16 reduced destruction of agriculture,17 and mitigation of other negative environmental externalities associated with high deer populations, such as depletion of forest undergrowth and displacement of other wildlife.18 Strategies other than culling deer, such as contraception or surgical sterilization, have been found to be “ineffective”19 and can have unintended consequences. In one study at Cornell University, where surgical sterilization of does was attempted at $1,200 per doe, multitudes of bucks were attracted when the does, rendered

14. WHITE-TAILED DEER MGMT. PLAN, supra note 13, at 54.
15. See id. at 54.
17. WHITE-TAILED DEER MGMT. PLAN, supra note 13, at 22.
18. Id. at 27-28.
19. See id. at 49-52. Surgical sterilization is also prohibitively expensive at $1,200 per deer. See id. at 51.
unable to conceive, remained in estrous indefinitely instead of only during the few weeks otherwise typical and, as a result, continuously attracted bucks in unprecedentedly large numbers, thereby defeating the objectives of the program and causing ecological disruption.\textsuperscript{20}

The change from 500 to 150 feet makes bow hunting possible in semi-rural, low-density areas, whereas in recent decades, it was largely only feasible in rural areas due to the 500 foot setback requirements.\textsuperscript{21}

\section*{C. Penal Law Restrictions on the Discharge of a Long Bow}

In addition to the Environmental Conservation Law, New York’s Penal Law section 265.35(3) makes it a class A misdemeanor to “otherwise than in self defense or in the discharge of official duty . . . wilfully discharge[] any species of . . . weapon . . . in a public place, or in any place where there is any person to be endangered thereby.”\textsuperscript{22} A New York Attorney General opinion, while sidestepping the question of what constitutes a “public place,” suggests that a discharge of a weapon in compliance with the Environmental Conservation Law is, \textit{ipso facto}, compliant with Penal Law section 265.35(3).\textsuperscript{23} Moreover, regardless of setbacks, a discharge of a firearm or weapon on private property by or with permission of the property holder is not likely to be deemed “a public place.”\textsuperscript{24}


\textsuperscript{21} For these purposes, the Nassau-Suffolk Regional Comprehensive Plan’s definition of “low density” as an area with a maximum of one dwelling per acre has been adopted. See NASSAU-SUFFOLK REGIONAL PLAN. BOARD, THE NASSAU-SUFFOLK REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 51 (1970), available at http://www.suffolkcountyny.gov/Portals/0/planning/CompPlan/NassSuffRegCPSumr.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/R5SP-YVV6.

\textsuperscript{22} N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.35(3) (McKinney 1974).

\textsuperscript{23} The context was a parallel limitation on discharge of firearms. “Thus, if the use of firearms is in accordance with the ECL . . . there would be no violation of the Penal Law [section 265.35].” 87-64 N.Y. Op. Att’y Gen. 139-40 (1987).

\textsuperscript{24} The cases on point involving this provision relate to discharges of a firearm occurring in places other than on private property. See, e.g., People v.
III. THE AUTHORITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN NEW YORK STATE

A. New York’s Local Governance

The State of New York is, for the purposes of municipal governance, divided into counties, cities, towns, and villages, each of which is deemed a “local government.” Although only capable of exercising those powers granted by the State Constitution or legislature, local governments have broad authority in New York State.

1. Counties

The division of New York State into counties dates back to provincial times. A county is a political subdivision of the state and municipal corporation. Like a town, discussed below, a county is an involuntary corporation in that it was not formed by popular action, as are villages and, in practice, cities. Instead, it is created “for convenience and for more expeditious state administration.” Outside of New York City, which encompasses five counties, a county is the largest subdivision in the State. Counties wholly encompassed in cities, such as the five counties comprising New York City, are exceptional in that they do not have self-governance.

25. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 3(d)(2). See also N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 2 (McKinney 2014); N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 2(8) (McKinney 2014).
30. Curtis, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
31. See N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a).
2. **Towns**

A town is, like a county, a subdivision of the state, a municipal corporation, and an “involuntary” corporation in that it was not formed by popular action.\(^{32}\) Towns are subdivisions of counties.\(^{33}\)

3. **Cities**

A city is a municipal corporation.\(^{34}\) Cities can only be formed by the state legislature’s approval of a charter.\(^{35}\) However, unlike a town or county, a city has, in practice, been a voluntary corporation with the charter submitted for approval of the legislature by the initiative of voters in the area.\(^{36}\) The extent of self-governance differs from city to city since it is dependent on the terms of the city’s charter.

4. **Villages**

A village is a municipal corporation and, similar to a city and unlike a town or a county, it is a “voluntary” corporation in that voters establish villages upon a proposition to incorporate a territory as a village.\(^{37}\) All villages exist within towns.\(^{38}\) The

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32. See N.Y. TOWN LAW § 2 (McKinney 2014); Curtis, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
33. State law divides towns into two classes, primarily based on population. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 10 (McKinney 2014). This distinction is not relevant for the discussion herein.
34. ST. OF N.Y., DEPT OF ST., LOCAL GOVERNMENT HANDBOOK 29 (2009), available at www.dos.ny.gov/lg/publications/Local_Government_Handbook.pdf [hereinafter LOCAL GOV’T HANDBOOK], archived at http://perma.cc/6KVV-P34A. State law formerly divided cities into three classes, based on population. Id. at 52. A relic of this can be found in, inter alia, N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 107 (McKinney 2014). This was abolished in favor of a general regime applicable to all cities, effective in 1924, but maintaining the “second class” cities that were formed before this time as still subject to the second-class city regime. LOCAL GOV’T HANDBOOK, supra, at 52-53. The historical distinctions are not relevant for the discussion herein.
35. LOCAL GOV’T HANDBOOK, supra note 34, at 51-52. The original charters of two cities, Albany and New York City, precede the existence of New York State. Id. at 51. The most recent charter was that of the City of Rye in 1942. Id.
36. Id. at 51-52. See also Vill. of Kenmore, 169 N.E. at 639; Curtis, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
37. See N.Y. VILLAGE LAW §§ 2-200, 2-202 (McKinney 2014). See also Vill. of Kenmore, 169 N.E. at 639.
Municipal Home Rule Law requires that “any local law adopted by a town board shall be effective and operative only in that portion of such town outside of any village or villages therein except in a case where the power of such town board extends to and includes the area of the town within any such village or villages.”

5. Hamlets

Hamlets are unincorporated areas governed by the towns within which they are situated, often coterminous with census designated places. They have no status under state law.

B. Home Rule

The current constitution dates from 1938, one of five over the history of New York State. Home rule powers, i.e., a high degree of autonomy in local affairs, were provided by New York’s Constitution to cities in 1894, counties in 1938, larger villages in

38. N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 2-200(1)(c) (McKinney 1974).
40. See generally LOCAL GOV'T HANDBOOK, supra note 34, at 67; Geographic Terms and Concepts – Place, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/gtc/gtc_place.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) [hereinafter Geographic Terms and Concepts], archived at https://perma.cc/3WPH-BCRG?type=source. The Census Bureau defines a “census designated place” as an area delineated to provide data for settled concentrations of population that are identifiable by name but are not legally incorporated under the laws of the state in which they are located. The boundaries usually are defined in cooperation with local or tribal officials and generally updated prior to each decennial census. These boundaries, which usually coincide with visible features or the boundary of an adjacent incorporated place or another legal entity boundary, have no legal status, nor do these places have officials elected to serve traditional municipal functions. . . . CDPs must be contained within a single state and may not extend into an incorporated place. Geographic Terms and Concepts, supra.
41. Schaffer Law Library’s Guide on the New York State Constitution, ALB. L. SCH., http://www.albanylaw.edu/media/user/librarypdfs/guides/nyconsti.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/4TB9-3BBR?type=pdf. The others were in 1777, 1821, 1846, and 1894, though major revisions were made at other times. Id.
1940, and all villages and towns in 1963.\textsuperscript{42} The 1963 revisions required the legislature to enact a home rule law. The home rule law subsequently enacted largely tracks the constitution's home rule provisions,\textsuperscript{43} and it contains interpretative guidance stating that the, “[r]ights, powers, privileges and immunities granted to local governments by this article shall be liberally construed.”\textsuperscript{44} The State constitutional provision required the legislature to enact implementing legislation.\textsuperscript{45} The implementing legislation has a special State constitutional status: the legislature can only diminish or repeal a right legislatively granted to local governments by enacting a statute with approval of the governor in two successive legislative sessions.\textsuperscript{46}

The State Constitution guarantees that, regardless of the scope of the implementing legislation, “every local government shall have power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution.”\textsuperscript{47} Specifically noted, so long as not inconsistent with the constitution or State law, is the authority of local government to adopt and amend local laws related to “[t]he government, protection, order, conduct, safety, health and well-being of persons or property therein.”\textsuperscript{48} The subsequently enacted

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{44} N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 3(c). Previously, the opposite interpretative rule—known as “Dillon’s Rule” due to its association with an Iowa judge who was said to have created it, Judge John Forrest Dillon—applied narrowly construing any grant of power by the State. For the history of this rule and its application in New York State, see Roderick M. Hills, \textit{Hydrofracking and Home Rule: Defending and Defining an Anti-Preemption Canon of Statutory Construction in New York}, 77 ALB. L. REV. 647, 653 n. 26 & 27 (2013-14).
\item \textsuperscript{45} See N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(a)-(b).
\item \textsuperscript{46} \textit{Id.} art. IX, § 2(b)(1).
\item \textsuperscript{47} \textit{Id.} art. IX, § 2(c).
\item \textsuperscript{48} \textit{Id.} art. IX, § 2(c)(10).
\end{itemize}
Municipal Home Rule Law contains provisions nearly verbatim restating these constitutional provisions.\(^49\)

The Municipal Home Rule Law was enacted in a context that sought to augment the authority of local government. It clarifies,

\[
\text{[i]t is not the intention of the legislature ... to abolish or curtail any rights ... conferred upon or delegated to any local government ... unless a contrary intention is clearly manifest ... or to restrict the powers of the legislature to pass laws regulating matters other than the property, affairs or government of local governments.} \(^50\)
\]

Moreover, like the constitutional provision it is based upon, the law requires that it be “liberally construed” and that the “powers ... granted shall be in addition to all other powers granted to local governments by other provisions of law.”\(^51\)

C. Supersession

The Municipal Home Rule Law grants both towns and villages the right of “supersession.”\(^52\) This authorizes the modification of New York’s Town Law or Village Law, as applicable, “in its application to . . . the property, affairs or government of the town [or village, as applicable] or to other matters [specifically authorized by the Municipal Home Rule Law].”\(^53\) It merely allows a local government to supersede the application of the Town Law or Village Law, as applicable.\(^54\) Since any limitation on a town or village’s ability to regulate hunting, firearms, or weapons, does not derive from the Town...
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Law or Village Law, with an exception for towns noted below in Part IV(B), a town’s or village’s ability to supersede the Town Law or Village Law does not impact the question of whether a town or village can regulate hunting, the discharge of firearms, or a weapon beyond the regulations imposed by the State.

D. “Occupying the Field”

It is important to consider the extent of local government authority and where State law preempts it. The outer boundary of municipal home rule authority can be approximated as where the state “has demonstrated its intent to preempt an entire field and thereby preclude any further local regulation.” In such a case, “local laws regulating the same subject matter will be deemed inconsistent and will not be given effect.” The legislature’s interest in regulating “matters of statewide importance” has been described as “transcendent.”

1. Preemption Generally

In declaring unlawful a portion of a city ordinance prohibiting the carrying or possession of firearms or other weapons in an emergency, the Court noted that a “local ordinance attempting to impose any additional regulation in a field where the state has already acted will be regarded as conflicting with the state law and will be held to be invalid.”


In a case relating to whether Suffolk County, out of concern for the county’s water supply, could prohibit septic additives not already prohibited by New York State’s Environmental Conservation Law, New York’s Court of Appeals noted, “although the constitutional home rule provision confers broad police powers upon local governments relating to the welfare of its citizens, local governments may not exercise their police power by adopting a law inconsistent with . . . any general law of the State.”

The Court of Appeals established that a “local law may be ruled invalid as inconsistent with State law . . . where an express conflict exists between the State and local laws . . . [and] where the State has clearly evinced a desire to preempt an entire field.” Similarly, a “comprehensive and detailed statutory scheme” may evidence implied preemption by the State.

An “inconsistency” is found to exist where the local law “(1) prohibits conduct which the State law, although perhaps not expressly speaking to, considers acceptable or at least does not prescribe or (2) imposes additional restrictions on rights granted by State law.”

The New York Department of Environmental Conservation’s view as to whether a provision in the Environmental Conservation Law preempts local laws on the same subject matter is given special deference, since it is charged with responsibility for the Environmental Conservation Law.

In the context of municipal regulation of discharge of a firearm, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation has observed:

Clearly, enactment of a local law prohibiting discharge of firearms where a general state law expressly permits such discharge would prohibit an activity specifically permitted by state law. Accordingly, such a law is inconsistent with a

60. Id.
63. See id. at 903-04.
general law and beyond the authority of the municipality that enacted it.

By enactment of ECL Sec. 11-0931(4)(a)(2) prohibiting discharge of firearms within 500 feet of certain structures . . . the Legislature has shown its intention to occupy the field of regulation in this area and to preempt any inconsistent local enactment. . . . To hold otherwise would have the effect of rendering the State law a nullity, and lead to a subdividing of the State into jurisdictions with different discharge of firearms provisions. . . .

Recognizing the preemptive effect of ECL Sec. 11-0931(4), some municipalities have sought and obtained specific statutory authority to restrict discharge of firearms. Town Law Sec. 130(27) lists towns which may, upon 30-days notice to the Department of Environmental Conservation, restrict discharges in areas where such activity may be hazardous to the general public or nearby residents.\textsuperscript{64}

\section{2. Preemption of Penal Law}

New York's Penal Law is where the only other relevant state-level restrictions on the discharge of a firearm or weapon reside.\textsuperscript{65} In an Appellate Division case, evaluating whether Nassau County could lawfully prohibit pistols with an exterior substantially comprised of any color other than black, grey, silver, steel, nickel, or army green, owners of pistols of various colors, including a gold pistol commemorating Port Authority officers killed in the September 11, 2001 attacks, claimed that the State had preempted the field via the pistol licensing requirements in section 400.00 of the Penal Law.\textsuperscript{66} The court noted, "conflict preemption occurs when a local law prohibits what a State Law explicitly allows, or when a State Law prohibits what a local law

\textsuperscript{64} New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, Declaratory Ruling \#11-04 (March 4, 1992); see also Vill. of Lacona v. N.Y. Dep’t of Agric. & Mkts., 858 N.Y.S.2d 833, 834 (App. Div. 2008) (The Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets ordered a village not to apply a village ordinance found to be in conflict with the Environmental Conservation Law).
\textsuperscript{65} See supra Part II(C).
explicitly allows.”67 It further noted, “the Legislature’s enactment of a comprehensive and detailed regulatory scheme in an area in controversy is deemed to demonstrate an intent to preempt local laws.”68 Because of the detailed regulatory edifice already in existence at the state-level, Nassau County’s local law was deemed invalid.69

IV. MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE HUNTING OR THE DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM OR LONGBOW

A. Authority to Regulate Hunting

The question arises as to whether the state has “occupied the field” with respect to the regulation of hunting. The New York Attorney General has consistently held that local governments cannot restrict or otherwise regulate hunting since this power is exclusively vested with the state.70 New York State’s preeminence in the area of hunting is so strong that even an ordinance restricting hunting “except where permission in writing is granted by the owner of the land upon which hunting is to take place” was considered invalid by the New York Attorney General.71

Additionally, though Municipal Home Rule Law grants counties the authority to enact legislation for the “protection or preservation of game, game birds, fish or shell fish,” this authority is explicitly limited to “county-owned lands,” implying that outside of where a local government is acting in its proprietary capacity as landowner, the state has “occupied the field” with respect to the regulation of hunting.72 Arguably, this is due in part to the State of New York’s detailed, prescriptive

67. Id. at 584.
68. Id. at 585 (citations omitted).
69. Id. at 587.
regime with respect to the regulation of hunting that has strict licensure requirements for hunters,\textsuperscript{73} in addition to regulating seasons,\textsuperscript{74} the discharge of a firearm or longbow,\textsuperscript{75} and the species that can be hunted.\textsuperscript{76}

The hunting of wildlife within the State of New York requires possession of a valid basic hunting license.\textsuperscript{77} With respect to the hunting of deer, a basic hunting license only allows the holder to participate in the regular firearms season held throughout the State above Westchester County,\textsuperscript{78} and, exclusively in Suffolk County, a special firearms season held in January.\textsuperscript{79} Participation in this special firearms season is unique in that the Department of Environmental Conservation rules require a special permit to be issued by the relevant town based on quotas established by the Department of Environmental Conservation.\textsuperscript{80}

Obtaining the basic hunting license requires successful completion of a minimum ten-hour Department of Environmental Conservation-approved hunter safety education course\textsuperscript{81} and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{73} See N.Y. ENVT'L. CONSERV. LAW § 11-0701 (McKinney 2014).
  \item \textsuperscript{74} See generally id. § 11-0901.
  \item \textsuperscript{75} See supra Parts II(B), (C).
  \item \textsuperscript{76} N.Y. ENVT'L. CONSERV. LAW § 11-0901(10) (McKinney 2014).
  \item \textsuperscript{77} See id. §§ 11-0703(6)(a), 11-0713(3)(a)(3), 11-0901(13).
  \item \textsuperscript{78} See id. §§ 11-0903(7); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 1.24 (2015). See also id. § 1.11(0)(1). Although recent amendments to the Environmental Conservation Law allow for the establishment of a January weekday shotgun season in Westchester County, no implementing regulations have been proposed by the Department of Environmental Conservation. N.Y. ENVT'L. CONSERV. LAW §§ 11-0903(7)(A) & (B).
  \item \textsuperscript{79} N.Y. ENVT'L. CONSERV. LAW § 11-0903(7)(c), (h); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 1.24 (2014).
  \item \textsuperscript{80} N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 1.24(e), (g)-(i) (2014). Note that municipalities have the ability to sponsor special culling operations in January that are based on a different provision of law allowing for aggrieved property owners or municipalities to cull a specified number of deer based on special application to the Department of Environmental Conservation for a Deer Management Assistance Permit. In 2010, the most recent year for which data is available, private hunting was more than five times more effective than combined culling with Deer Management Assistance Permits and Deer Damage Permits (another category of culling permit). See WHITE-TAILED DEER MGMT. PLAN, supra note 13, at 23.
\end{itemize}
payment of a fee. A holder of the basic hunting license would not be permitted to bowhunt without taking an additional minimum eight-hour Department of Environmental Conservation-approved bowhunter education class and paying a fee for a “bowhunter privilege.” Therefore, to bowhunt in New York State, a total minimum of eighteen hours in education is required, along with payment of the fees for the basic license and for the bowhunter privilege.

With the prescriptive regime regulating hunting and its preemption of local government hunting regulations, we turn to the question of whether local government can, instead, regulate the discharge of a weapon beyond existing state law.

B. Authority to Regulate Firearms Discharge

While commentary is uniform regarding the non-authority of a local government in New York to regulate hunting, being within the exclusive province of state law, the question arises as to whether a local government can regulate the discharge of a firearm.

1. Definition of “Firearm”

No definition of “firearm” is provided in New York State’s laws related to local government. In other contexts, New York State’s definition of “firearm” can be divided into two categories. One is the Penal Law’s definition of a “firearm” as any pistol, revolver, sawed off rifle or shotgun, or rifles and shotguns with specified characteristics that are deemed to be military style.
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This definition, although explicitly imported into some contexts outside of the Penal Law, is narrower than the ordinary meaning of firearm,87 and therefore, is not assumed to apply to the matters discussed herein.

The other category of the “firearm” definition manifests differently in state laws and regulations but, unlike the Penal Law’s definition, shares the same general principal of being inclusive of all shotguns and rifles. One example is provided by New York’s General Business Law,88 which imports the Federal definition of “firearms” as:

(A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; (B) the frame or receiver of any such weapon; (C) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or (D) any destructive device [such as a bomb, grenade, or missile].89

2. Historical Municipal Authority to Regulate Firearms

Since 1870, the Village Law granted villages the explicit authority to regulate or prevent the discharge of firearms.90 A nearly identical provision existed in the Town Law beginning in 1919.91 However, in 1972, as part of a comprehensive revision of the Village Law, this explicit authority was removed in its entirety.92 In 1976, this authority was restored for one village, the Village of Green Island.93

87. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 710 (9th ed. 2009).
88. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 895(4) (McKinney 2014).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)-(4) (2012). Rules promulgated by New York State’s Department of Environmental Conservation define “firearm” for purposes of the fish and wildlife provisions of the Environmental Conservation Law along largely similarly lines, but also include air guns that fire projectiles at 600 feet per second or more and use at least .17 caliber ammunition. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 180.3(a)-(b) (2014).
90. See 1909 N.Y. Laws 4464; 1897 N.Y. Laws 394; 1870 N.Y. Laws 685.
91. 1919 N.Y. Laws 816.
93. N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 20-2003 (McKinney 2014). Green Island’s unique authority as a village to regulate firearms discharge is possibly due to the Town of Green Island and the Village of Green Island’s coterminous nature. See Casey McNulty, History, Pride Green Island (Feb. 22, 2005),
3. Present Municipal Authority to Regulate Firearms

Today, any county, town, city, or village has the explicit authority to “regulate the storage, possession and display of firearms, ammunition and explosives.”\(^94\) However, this is strictly limited in its application, and in effect only delegates authority to regulate commercial or other association-sponsored displays due to a statutory exclusion of authority to regulate “personal possession, use or ownership of firearms or ammunition.”\(^95\) Additionally, towns—and towns only—are granted authority to regulate the possession, sale, and use of air guns,\(^96\) and specified towns\(^97\) may prohibit the discharge of firearms “in areas in which such activity may be hazardous to the general public or nearby residents, and providing for the posting of such areas with signs giving notice of such regulations, which ordinances, rules and regulations may be more, but not less, restrictive than any other provision of law.”\(^98\)

State Attorney General opinions on the subject vary. Construing the City of Rye’s general authority, the State Attorney General, in a 1972 opinion, stated:

http://www.villageofgreenisland.com/history/, archived at https://perma.cc/KK7A-F39L?type=source. See also LOCAL GOV’T HANDBOOK, supra note 34, at 68 (“Five villages – Green Island in Albany County, East Rochester in Monroe County, and Scarsdale, Harrison and Mount Kisco in Westchester County – are coterminous with towns of the same name. A coterminous town-village is a unique form of local government organization. The town and village share the same boundaries and the governing body of one unit of the coterminous government may serve as the governing body of the other unit . . . .”). With the village government in Green Island acting as the governing body of the coterminous government unit, it would not have the authority to regulate the discharge of a firearm, authority that the town otherwise could potentially have enforced, outside of the specific legislative grant in Section 20-2003 of the New York Village Law.

\(^{94}\) N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 139-d(1) (McKinney 2014).
\(^{95}\) Id. § 139-d(2).
\(^{96}\) N.Y. TOWN LAW § 130(26) (McKinney 2014).
\(^{97}\) The towns are Huntington, Babylon, Smithtown, Islip, Brookhaven, Riverhead, Southampton, Niskayuna, Ramapo, Irondequoit, Greece, Pittsford, Brighton, Penfield, Perinton, Webster, Gates, Colonie, Vestal, and Union. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 130(27) (McKinney 2014).
\(^{98}\) Id.
[A]n ordinance which prohibited the discharge of firearms except by law enforcement officers would likely constitute a reasonable exercise of the police power if its operation were restricted to certain densely populated areas or areas where the discharge of firearms would be hazardous to the general public or to nearby residents.\textsuperscript{99}

A subsequent 1976 informal opinion noted that whereas “a village may not prohibit the carrying of a firearm, shotgun, rifle or air gun within the village[,]” it could, “by a fair, just and reasonable statute, prohibit the discharge of firearms within the village or within densely populated areas thereof.”\textsuperscript{100} The Attorney General added a proviso that “such prohibition, in order to be fair, just and reasonable, would have to apply to all persons and could not except . . . the owners of property or licensees of such owners.”\textsuperscript{101} Additionally, the law could not “amount to municipal control and regulation of hunting under the guise of exercise of the police power.”\textsuperscript{102}

On the other hand, a 1964 New York Attorney General opinion is unequivocal in stating:

[T]he general subject of conservation, hunting, and the use of firearms is a matter of state concern. . . . Since the provisions of Conservation Law . . . permit the discharge of any firearms in any area outside of 500 feet from . . . specified buildings, the action of a town board in increasing such limit . . . would be inconsistent with the Conservation Law.\textsuperscript{103}

A further reminder was provided in 1969 that “a town may not restrict hunting within its confines in the absence of specific legislative authority therefor.”\textsuperscript{104} It noted that the towns permitted by section 130(27) of New York’s Town Law to restrict

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\textsuperscript{99} N.Y. Op. Att’y Gen. 215 (1972). It is important to note that the opinion was issued in the context of a city, the powers of which are dependent on the terms of its charter, and therefore, not directly applicable to counties, towns, and villages.
\textsuperscript{101} Id.
\textsuperscript{102} Id.
\end{flushleft}
the discharge of firearms had specific legislative authorization to do so.\textsuperscript{105}

Moreover, in \textit{Richmond Boro Gun Club, Inc. v. City of New York}, a United States Magistrate Judge recommended, in the context of a ban by the City of New York of some semi-automatic rifles deemed by the city to be military style, that this “statute was not intended to preempt the entire field of regulations concerning the personal possession of weapons.”\textsuperscript{106}

As noted above, New York State Village Law explicitly grants only one village the right to limit discharge of a firearm beyond the restrictions in state law.\textsuperscript{107} Whether other villages have the general authority to do so for firearms or other weapons is not explicitly addressed. At least one resource states, in the context of an effort by the Village of Watkins Glen to ban the discharge of firearms within its boundaries, “Because the Watkins Glen regulation prohibits what the [Department of Environmental Conservation] regulations allow, it is inconsistent with the regulations, and therefore invalid.”\textsuperscript{108}

Although New York Attorney General opinions have experienced some variation on this topic, the Legislature appears to have expressed an intent to “occupy the field” with respect to the discharge of a firearm due to the Legislature’s removal of explicit plenary authority to regulate the discharge of firearms from all villages save for one and its limited grant of authority to

\textsuperscript{105} Id.

\textsuperscript{106} Richmond Boro Gun Club, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 92-CV-0151(RR), 1995 WL 422014, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 1994), \textit{mooted by 896 F. Supp. 276} (E.D.N.Y. 1995), \textit{aff’d}, 97 F.3d 681 (2d Cir. 1996). The Magistrate also noted that New York’s Penal Code sections 265.00 and 400.00 did not preempt the field. Id. at *7. However, note that this was in the context of a city, the powers of which are dependent on the terms of its charter, and therefore, not directly applicable to counties, towns, and villages.

\textsuperscript{107} The Village of Green Island in Albany County. See \textit{N.Y. Village Law} § 20-2003 (McKinney 2014).

\textsuperscript{108} N.Y. Op. Att’y Gen. 171 (1984) (citations omitted). However, note that this opinion of the Attorney General is potentially distinguishable since the subject was a portion of a wildlife area directly regulated by the Department of Environmental Conservation that fell within the boundaries of the Village of Watkins Glen.
regulate the discharge of firearms to just twenty specified towns and one village.109

C. Case Study: The Town of Huntington

In the case of the Town of Huntington, which is one of twenty towns with the limited authority to regulate the discharge of a firearm beyond state law, the definition of “firearm” has been expansively defined to “[i]nclude[] a weapon which acts by the force of gunpowder or from which a shot is discharged by the force of an explosion, as well as an air rifle, an air gun and a longbow.”110 Applying this broad definition, the Town of Huntington has prohibited any discharge of a “firearm” anywhere within the Town of Huntington, excluding the four incorporated villages contained within the Town’s boundaries.111 Although there are some exemptions, such as for law enforcement,112 an exemption for the owner or lessee of a dwelling house or guests or family members was removed in 1974.113

The Town of Huntington’s code provides a potential example of municipal overreach since the town’s expansive definition of “firearm” goes well beyond the authorizing Town Law provision that appears to use firearm in its generic sense, as a weapon expelling a projectile using gunpowder.114 The inclusion of a longbow in the Town of Huntington’s definition of “firearm” is not

109. First, only the discharge of firearms may be prohibited; and second, only where “such activity may be hazardous to the general public or nearby residents” and after “posting of such areas with signs giving notice of such regulations.” N.Y. TOWN LAW § 130(27) (McKinney 2014).


113. The former Town of Huntington Code section 109-3(E) was deleted by Town of Huntington Ordinance Number 74-CE-20 (June 25, 1974). Id. § 109-3.

114. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (2012) (the Federal definition of firearm includes “(A) any weapon . . . which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; [or] (B) the frame or receiver of any such weapon”). The Town of Huntington’s definition of “firearm” is so broad as to arguably prohibit the release of a flare by a mariner in distress within Town of Huntington waters.
consistent with this conventional meaning of firearm or any definition in use in federal or state law. Moreover, since the Town of Huntington contains large bodies of water such as Huntington Bay, prohibiting the discharge of a “firearm,” such as a shotgun discharging shotgun shells, can hardly be said to be “hazardous to the general public,” if in compliance with existing state law requirements. Finally, the Town’s code contains no reference to New York Town Law’s requirement of “posting of such areas with signs giving notice of such regulations.”

115. See supra Part IV(B).
117. Note that state law provides an exception to the rule prohibiting discharge of a firearm within 500 feet of a dwelling with respect to shotguns:

[t]he discharge of a shotgun over water by a person hunting migratory game birds if no dwelling house, farm building or farm structure actually occupied or used, school building, school playground, or public structure, factory or church, livestock or person is situated in the line of discharge less than five hundred feet from the point of discharge.

118. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 130(27) (McKinney 2014). How such posting would be done in a body of water is not clear. The one case on record in the Town of Huntington involved discharge of a firearm on land and, other than noting the explicit authority of Huntington to regulate discharge of firearms pursuant to New York Town Law section 130(27), the primary recorded decision (a denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss) did not address the propriety of Huntington’s broad prohibition on firearms discharge over the entire territory of the Town (excluding the four incorporated villages within its boundaries), the lack of posting by the Town as required by section 130(27), or the Town’s definition of the term “firearms” to include instruments such as “longbows” that appear to exceed the scope of the term “firearm” as used in section 130(27). People v.
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Note that there are no comparable provisions to section 130(27) of New York’s Town Law in any of the state laws applicable to villages, or to counties. This lends itself to a conclusion that if only specified towns have a (limited) statutory authority to regulate the discharge of a firearm beyond the state’s existing regulations; villages and counties have no such authority.

D. Restriction of Hunting or Firearms Activities Through Zoning Authority

At least one Second Department case finds that a town has the authority to impose, during a site plan approval, a condition that only shotguns be used on the property because “[t]he record indicates that the respondent [town] found that restrictions necessary to dispel the danger posed to adjacent land owners from stray bullets because even the least powerful rifles are capable of firing bullets in excess of the length and width of the property in question.” There is support for the proposition that, in its zoning authority, a municipality could, where stray bullets from a rifle may endanger adjacent properties due to the dimensions of the property on which they would be discharged, approve a site plan for a private hunting preserve conditioned on shotguns being the only firearms discharged onsite.

In another Second Department case, a gun club was in compliance with a town’s existing zoning ordinance because the

White, No. HUTO 16-01, slip op. at 1-2 (Suffolk Dist. Ct. June 14, 2001) (order denying motion to dismiss).
120. Since cities each merit potentially distinct treatment under state law due to their differing charters, they are outside the scope hereof.
121. The Village of Green Island is the only exception. See N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 20-2003 (McKinney 2014).
123. Id. at 436-37.
ordinance allowed for “[a]nnual membership clubs, including country, golf, tennis and swim clubs.”\textsuperscript{124}

As a general matter, any inference that a county, village, or town has plenary authority to regulate the discharge of a firearm, for example under its zoning authority, is implausible since such a finding would effectively render meaningless New York Town Law’s explicit grant of (limited) authority to regulate firearm discharges beyond state law only to specified towns and one village.\textsuperscript{125}

**E. Restrictions on Discharge of a Long Bow**

Bowhunting has been explicitly permitted in New York State since 1929.\textsuperscript{126} There are no resources directly on point regarding the capacity of a local government to limit the discharge of a longbow beyond the limitations already in state law. However, it can be reasoned that since the twenty towns and one village referenced above are merely granted explicit authority to regulate firearms discharge beyond the state’s existing regulations,\textsuperscript{127} they do not have such explicit authority with respect to longbows. Because the impact on safety with regard to longbows is significantly less than with respect to the discharge of a firearm, it can be assumed that a local government’s capacity to regulate longbows is limited at least to the same extent as its capacity to regulate firearms.

**F. Policy Considerations**

New York State law preempts a local government’s home rule powers if there is an express conflict with state law or if state law


\textsuperscript{125} “Statutes will not be construed as to render them ineffective.” N.Y. \textit{STAT. LAW} § 144 (McKinney 2014). “In the construction of a statute, meaning and effect should be given to all its language, if possible, and words are not to be rejected as superfluous when it is practicable to give to each a distinct and separate meaning.” \textit{Id.} § 231.

\textsuperscript{126} See 1929 N.Y. Laws 463.

\textsuperscript{127} See supra Part IV(B).
has implicitly occupied the field. Where the impact of a local government law is limited to activities within its borders, in the absence of state law expressly governing the same matters, a court should lean toward deference to the local government because it is unlikely that the State has implicitly occupied the field on such matter.

However, the regulation of activities with respect to wildlife has effects beyond the boundaries of local government. New York State’s claim to all wildlife is based, in part, on their migratory or ranging nature. An individual can have a possessory interest in a domesticated animal due to its confined range. Deer, on the other hand, range at will.

Therefore, a local government’s policy to prohibit hunting or the discharge of a firearm or longbow could have significant external effects on neighboring municipalities. For example, suppose Municipality A permitted hunting and Municipality B prohibited hunting. If Municipality A permitted hunting within its boundaries, its efforts to control the deer population—and avoid deer-vehicle collisions, property damage, and the ecological destruction associated with overabundant deer—would be detrimentally impacted or nullified by Municipality B’s prohibition of hunting. Municipality B could be functioning as a deer incubator for Municipality A, forcing Municipality A to absorb the externalities of Municipality B’s policy.

On the other hand, suppose Municipality A allowed unregulated hunting for the purpose of exterminating all deer in the area and its neighbor Municipality B allowed only hunting within the confines of state law, including educational requirements for hunters and biologically-informed seasonal, temporal, methodological, and numerical limitations on the

128. For a discussion on preemption, see supra Part III(D).
129. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 11-0105 (McKinney 2014).
130. One study notes that bucks on average have a home range of 717 acres in the spring, 415 acres in the summer, 907 acres in the fall, and 826 acres in the winter. Andrew Kahl Olson, Spatial Use and Movement Ecology of Mature Male White-Tailed Deer in Northcentral Pennsylvania 25, 34 (Oct. 17, 2014) (unpublished M.S. dissertation, University of Georgia) (on file with author).
131. See supra Part II(B).
harvesting of deer by hunters,\textsuperscript{132} aimed at preserving deer as a common resource for the benefit of the community while keeping the deer population at a level that neutralizes the negative impact of overabundant deer. If Municipality A permitted the unregulated and wanton hunting of the deer population, Municipality B’s efforts to maintain a biologically-informed viable and healthy deer population would be undermined because any time deer from Municipality B ranged into Municipality A they could be exterminated without any of the limitations applying in Municipality B.

Therefore, just as the migratory or ranging nature of wild animals provides a rational basis for the state’s assertion of proprietary authority over them,\textsuperscript{133} their migratory or ranging nature rationally supports state law preemption of the local regulation of hunting.\textsuperscript{134}

\section{V. CONCLUSION}

New York State delegates broad authority to local governments. However, the unique nature of migratory and ranging wildlife and the State’s assertion of authority with respect to such matters by the enactment of a prescriptive regulatory regime, lends strong support for the view that a local government does not have the authority to regulate hunting. Unless explicitly granted the authority to do so, it also lends credibility to the view that local government does not have the authority to regulate the discharge of a firearm or longbow in New York State—at least when discharged for the purposes of hunting—beyond State law.\textsuperscript{135}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{132} Such as provided by New York State’s Department of Environmental Conservation with respect to deer hunting. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, §§ 1.11, 1.19, 1.21, 1.24, 2.1 (2014). See generally id. §§ 1.13, 1.18, 1.20, 1.26, 1.27, 1.30, 2.3, 2.4.
\item \textsuperscript{133} N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 11-0105.
\item \textsuperscript{134} For a general discussion on the public policy behind the state asserting authority where a local government’s activities have significant detrimental externalities on non-residents or neighboring communities, see Hills, supra note 44, at 658-59.
\item \textsuperscript{135} If a local government ordinance is not preempted by state law it will generally stand if it was within the local government’s powers and has a
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
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For the twenty towns and one village granted the authority to regulate the discharge of a firearm, there is some limited authority to regulate firearms (not longbows) beyond State law. For any other county, town, or village, an ordinance regulating the discharge of a firearm or longbow or otherwise regulating hunting beyond State law would, it seems, be a sitting duck.

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136. Ordinances, such as that enacted by the Town of Huntington, that purport to outlaw any discharge of a firearm or longbow and are otherwise compliant with State law are, when scrutinized in light of State law, overly broad. See *supra* Part IV(C).
§ 139-d. Storage and display of firearms, ammunition and explosives.

1. Any municipal corporation may by local law or ordinance regulate the storage, possession and display of firearms, ammunition or explosives.

   Such regulations may provide for:

   (a) the establishment and enforcement of standards of design, construction and maintenance of buildings and structures in which firearms, ammunition or explosives are stored;

   (b) the establishment and enforcement of standards of security for the storage of such firearms, ammunition or explosives;

   (c) the location of such buildings and structures;

   (d) the quantity of firearms, ammunition or explosives which may be stored in such buildings and structures;

   (e) the manner of such storage; and

   (f) the times and circumstances under which such firearms, ammunition or explosives may be displayed to public view.

2. The regulations provided for herein shall not apply to the personal possession, use or ownership of firearms or ammunition therefor.

3. The exercise of the power granted in this section by a county shall relate only to the area thereof outside any city, or village; the exercise of such power by a town shall relate only to the area thereof outside the village or villages therein.

Accessed via: Laws of New York at: http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/lawssrch.cgi?NVLWO:

Last accessed, March 31, 2016
Chapter 109: Firearms


§ 109-1 Definitions.
The following definitions shall govern the interpretation of this chapter unless otherwise expressly defined herein:

FIREARM
Includes a weapon which acts by the force of gunpowder or from which a shot is discharged by the force of an explosion, as well as an air rifle, an air gun and a longbow.

TOWN OF HUNTINGTON
Includes all areas within the Town of Huntington exclusive of areas wholly within any incorporated village.

§ 109-2 Prohibited areas.
(A) No person shall discharge a firearm in those areas of the Town of Huntington declared by this chapter to be areas in which such activity is hazardous to the general public or nearby residents.

(B) The areas described hereafter are hereby declared to be areas wherein the discharge of firearms is deemed hazardous to the general public or nearby residents and, therefore, prohibited: all the area within the Town of Huntington not included within the boundaries of the incorporated villages.
[Amended 12-9-1975 by L.L. No. 2-1975]

§ 109-3 Exemptions.
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to:

(A) A law enforcement officer in the performance of his official duties.

(B) Programs conducted by public or private schools offering instruction or training in the use of firearms.

(C) The authorized use of a pistol, rifle or target range regularly operated and maintained by a police department or other law enforcement agency or by any duly organized membership corporation or by any municipal corporation.

(D) The lawful use of a firearm in the defense of person or property.

(E) Duly recognized parade or marching groups, including any United States military organizations and the Huntington Battalion of Minute Men and duly recognized veterans' groups.
[Added 1-20-1976 by L.L. No. 1-1976[1]]

[1] Editor's Note: An original Subsection (e), exempting the owner or lessee of a dwelling house or guests or family members from the provisions of this chapter, was repealed 6-25-1974 by Ord. No. 74-CE-20.

(F) Long bow hunting, during deer hunting season only, as outlined by the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, pursuant to a validly issued license by the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. Long bow hunting in accordance with this chapter and Chapter 159 of the Code of the Town of Huntington shall be permitted providing that:

(i) Notification, in writing, is given to the Town's Department of Public Safety and local police department, prior to the commencement of said activity; and

(2) Residents whose homes are within 150 feet of long bow hunting activity shall be notified, in writing, prior to the
commencement of said activity whenever possible and/or as circumstances permit. Anyone who willfully disregards this provision shall be subject to penalties as set forth in this chapter.

§ 109-4 Penalties for offenses. [1]

Any person or business entity who commits an act in violation of this chapter shall, upon conviction thereof, be guilty of a violation subject to a fine or penalty of not less than one hundred ($100.) dollars and not more than one thousand ($1,000.) dollars for a conviction of a first offense; upon the conviction of a second offense, a fine or penalty of not less than five hundred ($500.) dollars and not more than two thousand five hundred ($2,500.) dollars; and upon conviction of a third or subsequent offense, where the offense occurred within five (5) years of the commission of the first offense, shall be punishable by a fine or penalty of not less than five hundred ($500.) dollars and not more than five thousand ($5,000.) dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding fifteen (15) days, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

[1] Editor's Note: Original Section 18-4, which preceded this section and which provided for the posting of at least twelve (12) signs in each area where the discharge of firearms is prohibited, was repealed 2-6-1979 by L.L. No. 1-1979.